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Abstract 
This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary 
compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional and political factors. 
The framework is applied to Spain’s Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 
2002-2015. Fiscal non-compliance among Spain’s regions has proven persistent. It increases 
with the size of growth forecasting errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, 
factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase 
during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances become accentuated, and market financing 
costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact on containing fiscal non-
compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multi-level governance systems such as Spain’s 
requires a comprehensive assessment of inter-governmental fiscal arrangements that looks 
beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible. 
Keywords: fiscal compliance, rules, fiscal federalism, soft budget constraints. 





Este trabajo propone un marco analítico para analizar el grado de cumplimiento de los 
objetivos presupuestarios en marcos descentralizados, considerando factores económicos e 
institucionales. Este marco se aplica a las Comunidades Autónomas (CCAA) de España en el 
período 2002-2015. En el trabajo se encuentra que la desviación observada del déficit público 
autonómico con respecto al objetivo fijado aumenta conforme lo hace la desviación de  
la previsión del crecimiento económico y cuanto más exigente es el objetivo fijado. Ambos 
factores, no obstante, no se encuentran bajo el control completo de los Gobiernos 
autonómicos. Los resultados apuntan a que el grado de cumplimiento tiende a verse afectado 
negativamente en los años electorales, cuanto mayor es el desajuste entre ingresos y gastos 
propios, o cuando el coste de financiación disminuye. Las reglas fiscales parecen no haber 
tenido un impacto significativo en estos patrones. La evidencia presentada indica que la 
mejora del grado de cumplimiento con respecto a los objetivos no pasa solo por reforzar el 
marco de reglas vigente, sino que depende de un conjunto amplio de factores institucionales, 
como el nivel de corresponsabilidad fiscal, el marco de gobernanza de la política fiscal en un 
contexto de alta descentralización, o el grado de aplicación de las normas vigentes. 
Palabras clave: cumplimiento de objetivos presupuestarios, reglas fiscales, federalismo fiscal, 
restricción presupuestaria blanda. 
Códigos JEL: H61, H68, H72, H77. 
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1 Introduction 
The process of fiscal consolidation in Europe in the aftermath of the global and Euro sovereign 
debt crises has brought to the forefront the challenges of enforcing fiscal discipline in federal or 
decentralized countries. The literature on fiscal federalism has attributed this challenge to the 
presence of soft budget constraints at the subnational level.1 That is, the inability of subnational 
governments (henceforth SNGs) to keep fiscal deficit outcomes within targets set as part of 
fiscal consolidation strategies at the general government level. Soft budget constraints have 
been shown to originate from the inability of central governments (hereafter CGs) to credibly 
commit to not bailing out SNGs and, as such, to constrain SNGs fiscal outcomes 
(Vigneault, 2007). Soft budgets have been shown to be driven by political motives, including 
re-election, government formation and stability (Sato, 2007). They are aggravated by flawed 
intergovernmental fiscal institutions, including large vertical fiscal imbalances, weak fiscal rules, 
and limited market discipline (Rodden et al., 2003, Ter-Minassian, 2015). Flawed institutions 
act by raising expectations among voters and creditors that CG must be accountable in the 
event SNGs are not able to fulfill their spending mandates or debt obligations.2 Soft budget 
constraints have been typically assessed by exploring the determinants of fiscal outturns using 
fiscal reaction functions.3 
A small but growing empirical literature on the implementation of fiscal consolidations 
offers a different perspective. Rather than searching for reasons for why fiscal outcomes 
cannot be constrained and targets enforced, it questions whether fiscal targets or the forecasts 
basing such targets are set appropriately in the first place.4 A number of papers have shown 
that official forecasts tend to be optimistic among advanced economies (Auerbach, 1999, 
Strauch et al., 2009, Leal et al., 2008; Jonung and Larch, 2006; Frankel and Schreger, 2013). 
Optimistic fiscal forecasts have been attributed to difficulties in forecasting downturns and 
booms in real time and strategic reasons (Beetsma et al, 2013). Another set of factors are 
related to strategic considerations, which have been shown to be salient in the EU among 
countries seeking to comply with the Maastricht convergence process (Strauch et al., 2009) 
and ex-ante deficit rules under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (Bruck and Stepan, 2006 
and Beestma et al., 2009). 
This paper contributes to both literatures by seeking to better understand the 
determinants of fiscal non-compliance at the subnational level. We define fiscal 
non-compliance as events when SNG budget balance outturns are below corresponding 
targets. Our focus is to understand whether fiscal non-compliance is the result of soft 
budgets or due to technical and institutional factors resulting in unrealistic fiscal targets. An 
emerging empirical literature has started to look at the determinants of compliance in 
rule-based frameworks (Cordes et al., 2015, and Reuter, 2015). However, this literature has 
mostly focused on national policies and has not discussed the institutional and political 
considerations behind fiscal non-compliance. 
                                                                          
1.  See Ter-Minassian (2015) for a recent review of this vast literature. 
2. Attempts to address some of the flaws in the context of the European Union (EU), in particular strengthening fiscal rules, 
without addressing others (e.g., vertical fiscal imbalances) have shown to be ineffective (Foremny, 2014, Kotia and 
Lledó, 2015).  
3. See Argimón and Hernandez de Cos (2012) for a review of this empirical literature. 
4. Reuter (2015) shows that the introduction of numerical fiscal limits enforced through fiscal rules, even if not complied 
with, tilt fiscal policy outturns towards those numerical limits. So, in fact, compliance seems to matter less than whether 
the chosen numerical limit was set to an optimal or appropriate level. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA  8 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1632 
This paper proposes a conceptual framework that tries to distinguish the impact of a 
soft budget constraint from that of fiscal forecast and target setting on fiscal non-compliance. 
Our framework looks at both the capacity and incentives to comply. It distinguishes between 
events when SNGs have the capacity but not the incentives to comply with fiscal targets from 
events when SNGs have the incentives but not the capacity for fiscal compliance. We define 
fiscal non-compliance as voluntary under the former and involuntary under the latter. We argue 
that voluntary fiscal non-compliance is triggered by factors conducive to soft budget 
constraints, whereas involuntary fiscal non-compliance is the result of factors conducive to 
unrealistic or ambitious fiscal targets.  
Political economy channels and politics take a front seat in our framework. Our 
framework shows that both voluntary and involuntary fiscal non-compliance occurs mainly 
through political economy channels that jointly influence CGs’ and SNGs’ decisions to, 
respectively, enforce and comply with fiscal targets. Channels conducive to voluntary fiscal 
non-compliance act mainly by increasing CGs’ political costs of enforcing and decreasing 
SNGs’ costs of non-complying with SNG targets. Channels conducive to involuntary fiscal 
non-compliance are those that increase CGs’ political cost of ensuring fiscal targets at the 
general government level are met, leading the CG to shift the burden of meeting these targets 
to SNGs. Such costs are determined by the impact such decisions have on the electoral, 
government formation, and other political objectives government officials and their parties have 
at the central and subnational levels, which is ultimately framed by politics and political 
institutions at the supranational, national, and regional levels.  
We construct an empirical model to test this framework. From among a set of 
economic, institutional, and political factors, the model identifies the ones most relevant to an 
understanding of voluntary and involuntary fiscal non-compliance. The empirical model is 
estimated using data from Spain’s Autonomous Communities. Spain’s Autonomous 
Communities (hereafter also referred to as regions, regional governments, or simply RGs) 
makes for an interesting case study for a number of reasons. Regional governments have 
gained significant political and fiscal autonomy over the last four decades through a process of 
decentralization (Hernández de Cos and Pérez, 2013). During this period regional governments 
have become accountable for delivering more than ⅔ of social services, most in the health and 
education sectors (Lledó, 2015). The Spanish decentralization has been asymmetric with 
revenue and expenditure decentralization occurring at different paces depending on the region, 
leading to both temporal and cross-sectional variations in both fiscal and political autonomy 
indicators. Spain’s regional governments have been subject to nominal budget balance targets 
for the last two decades. Their record in meeting these targets, as discussed below, has also 
varied significantly. And so has the rule-based framework used to monitor and enforce 
compliance with those targets. In addition to fiscal rules, regions have been subject to 
market-imposed discipline, given that most regional government’s debt is regularly scrutinized 
by rating agencies. In this respect, Spain is one of the major sub-sovereign bond issuer 
world-wide, presenting a significant heterogeneity across regions in issuing practices and 
amounts (Canuto and Liu, 2013, and Pérez and Prieto, 2015).  
The post-crisis period in Spain has been marked by widespread non-compliance. 
Regions as a group have missed their target systematically every year since 2010, accounting 
for the bulk of the fiscal non-compliance at the general government level and constituting one 
of the main risks to Spain’s on-going fiscal consolidation process (AIReF, 2016). Critical to our 
analysis, fiscal non-compliance, while widespread, varied significantly across regions both in 
terms of frequency and margins.  
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Existing empirical literature has studied fiscal discipline among Spanish regions by 
assessing the determinants of fiscal deficit and public debt outturns (for example, Argimón and 
Hernández de Cos, 2012; and Hernández de Cos and Pérez, 2013). This literature has typically 
looked at economic, institutional, and political factors affecting the size of fiscal outturns 
irrespective of the targets aimed at constraining them. Critical factors promoting fiscal discipline 
included greater tax autonomy, higher market-financing costs and credit ratings, and the 
electoral calendar, but fiscal rules and other political factors are excluded. Fiscal indiscipline 
appears to have a strong inertial component, with the size of regions’ fiscal deficits in one year 
largely influenced by the corresponding size in the previous year. A related literature has also 
looked at the determinants of CGs’ budgetary deviations (Leal and Perez, 2011). To our 
knowledge Leal and López Laborda (2015) and Lago-Peñas et al. (2016) are the only empirical 
analyses examining the regional determinants of compliance with fiscal deficit targets among 
Spanish regions. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section proposes a conceptual 
framework to identify economic, institutional, and political determinants of fiscal 
non-compliance in multi-level governance systems. Section 3 reviews key institutional elements 
in Spain’s multi-level governance system, with a focus on how fiscal targets are set, monitored, 
and enforced. Informed by the framework and Spain’s institutional features, Section 4 
proposes alternative hypotheses, details the empirical methodology to test these hypotheses, 
and discusses our empirical results. Section 5 concludes with some policy considerations. 
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2 Fiscal Non-Compliance in Multi-Level Governments: A Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Defining Fiscal Non-Compliance 
The proposed framework defines fiscal non-compliance as the outcome when a government is 
unable to meet numerical fiscal targets or ceilings. The fiscal target or ceiling could be the 
numerical limit of a fiscal rule. A government unable or unwilling to meet a fiscal target or ceiling 
is defined as non-compliant.  
Fiscal non-compliance can be voluntary or involuntary. Fiscal non-compliance is 
voluntary when the non-compliant government has the capacity, but not the incentives to 
comply with a fiscal target. Fiscal non-compliance is involuntary when the non-compliant 
government has the incentives but not the capacity to comply with a fiscal target. A 
government has the capacity to meet the target if it has sufficient fiscal resources or fiscal 
instruments to garner the necessary resources to meet the target—hereafter defined as fiscal 
capacity. A government has the incentives to meet the target when the costs of non-complying 
with the target outweigh the non-compliance benefits. 
2.2 The Fiscal Non-Compliance Problem 
The fiscal non-compliance problem can be characterized as a sequential game between a 
central and a regional government (Figure 1.a). In the first stage, the central government (CG) 
sets a fiscal target for the RG knowing the RG’s expected fiscal capacity. The fiscal target is 
ex-ante feasible. In the second stage, the RG decides whether to comply with the fiscal target 
based on expectations about its fiscal capacity and on whether the CG will enforce the fiscal 
target. In the third and final stage, the central government decides whether to enforce the 
target based on RG’s compliance decision in the second stage and its expected fiscal 
capacity. Nature reveals itself only at the end of the game in the form of a shock affecting the 
RG’s fiscal capacity and, therefore, the feasibility of the fiscal target.5  
Voluntary and involuntary fiscal non-compliance may also emerge as equilibrium 
outcomes under this game. Voluntary fiscal non-compliance occurs when the RG is not willing 
to comply with the budget balance target regardless of whether CG is expected to enforce it, 
and even when fiscal capacity to comply with the target is highly expected. Under these 
circumstances, the shock can be assumed away, because the target is feasible both before 
and after the shock —i.e. target is both ex-ante and ex-post feasible— (Figure 1.b). Involuntary 
fiscal non-compliance occurs when RG is willing to and ex-ante capable of complying, but 




                                                                          
5. In practice fiscal target assessments usually occur at a time when factors underlying fiscal capacity such as nominal 
GDP are still only estimates. 
6. Under an involuntary equilibrium, RGs must always be ex-ante capable of complying with fiscal targets (i.e., fiscal 
targets must be ex-ante feasible). Ex-ante unfeasible fiscal targets could not be credibly enforced, fostering involuntary 
non-compliance. 
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Figure 1. The Fiscal Non Compliance Problem 
a. Sequencing 
CG chooses target → RG chooses to comply or not→ CG chooses to enforce or not→ Shock 
b. Voluntary Fiscal Non-Compliance 
CG chooses target → RG  chooses not to comply→ CG may enforce or not→ Target ex-post feasible 
c. Involuntary Fiscal Non-Compliance 
CG chooses target → RG chooses to comply → CG to enforce → Target ex-post unfeasible 
NOTE: CG = central government; RG = regional government. 
2.3 Voluntary Fiscal Non-Compliance and Soft Budget Constraints 
Voluntary fiscal non-compliance could be the result of soft budget constraints. RGs with soft 
budgets are not constrained to finance their spending from an approved budget. Therefore, 
they would not feel constrained to deviate from fiscal targets set in this budget if doing so will 
prevent them from providing a desired level of public good and services. In the multi-level 
government context, the soft budget constraint problem arises from the CG’s lack of a credible 
no-bail out commitment that allows RGs to overspend in the expectation of an eventual 
bailout.7 
Soft budget constraints and voluntary fiscal non-compliance are interconnected. The 
theoretical literature models soft budget constraints (SBC) as a sequential game (Inman, 2003; 
Rodden et al., 2003; Vigneault, 2007; Bordignon, 2006). Actions in the voluntary fiscal 
non-compliance game described above are logical extensions of the SBC game. In the first 
stage, the CG announces its intergovernmental transfer policy and sets RG budget balance 
target. In the second stage, the RG does not believe on the CG’s transfer policy, expects a 
bailout, overspends, and thus deviates from the budget balance target. In the third stage, CG’s 
fulfils RG’s expectation by bailing it out, thereby not enforcing the breach in the budget balance 
target.8 Much like in the voluntary fiscal non-compliance game, nature’s draw does not make a 
difference and the target remains feasible.  
 
Figure 2. Soft Budget Constraint and Fiscal Non-Compliance Problems 
Sequencing 
CG sets transfer/target → RG expects bailout/overspends/ does not comply  
→ CG bails out/ do not to enforce
NOTE: CG = central government; RG = regional government. 
Bailout and overspending incentives complement each other to spur voluntary fiscal 
non-compliance. Two necessary but not sufficient conditions characterize soft budgets and 
non-compliant governments. The first is that CG must find it optimal not to enforce the fiscal 
target and to provide additional resources to RG in stage 3. It will do so if the economic and 
political costs of denying additional resources (see below), thereby enforcing the target, exceed 
                                                                          
7. A bailout is broadly defined to account for not only resources granted to subnational governments in the event of a 
fiscal or financial crisis, such as emergency liquidity funds and outright debt restructuring, but also less extreme situations 
observed outside crisis. For instance, it may take the form of change in the allocation of formula grants or simply 
unconditional gap filling transfers. A bailout may include situations where SNG’s borrowing restrictions are lifted allowing 
them to borrow to finance above-the-target fiscal deficit levels. 
8. A critical assumption here is that the compliance assessment takes place before the bailout (i.e. in the second stage). 
Bailouts that occur prior to the compliance assessment period (e.g. gap-filling transfers) would help to avoid or mitigate 
fiscal non-compliance. This requires corrective fiscal non-compliance measures or controlling the impact of alternative 
factors on uncorrected measures so as to take gap-filling transfers into account.  
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the bailout/non-enforcement costs in the form of administrative, legal or financial penalties, as 
well as triggered by deviations from national or supranational fiscal rules as well as reputational 
losses against financial markets and the public at large. Under these circumstances, the 
bailout/non-enforcement strategy is ex-post optimal. The second necessary condition is that 
the RG, knowing that the CG has an incentive to provide additional resources and not to 
enforce the target, finds it optimal to overspend and not comply in stage 2 (i.e., overspending is 
ex-ante optimal). An ex-post optimal bailout will not lead to non-compliance if overspending is 
not optimal. This may occur, for instance, if a bailout comes with costly conditions attached 
(e.g., loss of fiscal autonomy, unpopular reforms). At the same time, by construction, an 
overspending optimal strategy cannot exist in the absence of an ex-post optimal bailout. In 
short, for voluntary fiscal non-compliance to occur, factors that raise both bailout and 
overspending incentives must be in place.  
2.4 Bailout and Overspending Incentives 
CGs may choose to bailout RGs for economic and political motives. 
— Economic Motives. A benevolent CG that care for the welfare of the whole 
nation would choose to bailout a fiscally irresponsible RG to avoid the negative 
spillovers to other jurisdictions and to itself. Negative spillovers to other 
jurisdictions —referred to as horizontal spillovers— usually take the form of 
under-provision of goods and services by the non-rescued RG to other RGs. 
Negative spillovers to the CG, or more broadly, to the general government —
referred to as vertical spillovers— may occur if default of a non-rescued RG 
endangers the banking system or the corporate sector nationwide because of 
their exposure to RG debt thereby increasing fiscal risks and lowering credit 
ratings at the central or general government levels (Inman, 2003). Bailout 
incentives are expected to decrease with bailout pecuniary costs for CGs and 
increase with bailout economic benefits. Pecuniary costs are expected to increase 
with the size of the region: the larger the region, the larger the cost of the public 
goods and services it provides. However, the impact of region size on bailout 
economic benefits is ambiguous and depends on assumptions about the 
“extensive” and “intensive” nature of the spillover. The larger the region, the larger 
the “extensive” nature of the spillover: the larger are the number of regions and 
individuals benefitting from the public goods and services provided by that region, 
the larger are the bailout economic benefits (Wildasin, 1997). But, the smaller the 
region, the larger is the “intensive” nature of the spillover and the larger the 
amount of public goods and services appropriated by each citizen in the bailout 
region (Crivelli and Stahl, 2013). Bailout incentives are, therefore, expected to 
increase with RG size if the bailout benefits from the extensive nature of the 
negative spillovers outweigh both the benefits from its corresponding intensive 
nature and the bailout pecuniary costs (Wildasin, 1997). Otherwise, bailout 
incentives are expected to decrease with RG size (Crivelli and Stahl, 2013). 
— Political Motives. CGs may also bailout RGs to create the conditions to govern, 
stay in power, and re-elect their principals. Bailout incentives are greater if directed 
towards RGs that are well represented in the national legislature, and thus 
influential for government stability and the passage of critical legislation (Porto and 
Sanguinetti, 2001). Similar motives may also lead CGs to bailout regions with 
which they are politically aligned —i.e., regions where government incumbents are 
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from the same party or coalition of CG incumbents (Grossman, 1994).9 The CG 
may also offer bailouts to ensure national unity (Leite-Monteiro and Sato, 2003). 
As a result, bailout incentives are likely to increase in regions where representation 
at the national or subnational level of pro-autonomy parties is larger (Bolton and 
Roland, 1997).  
 
Flawed intergovernmental fiscal frameworks increase bailout and overspending 
incentives. They do so by raising expectations among voters and creditors that the CG must be 
accountable in the event RGs are not able to fulfill their spending mandates or debt obligations 
(Von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996). Mindful of the political costs of not fulfilling those 
expectations, CG bailout incentives will likely increase, raising RG bailout expectations and 
increasing overspending incentives. Rodden et al. (2003) and Ter-Minassian (2015) list a 
number of institutional flaws that can be broadly categorized in: (i) limited fiscal autonomy; (ii) 
lack of pre-conditions for market discipline; and (iii) weak administrative controls and fiscal 
rules. Limited fiscal autonomy may be result of RGs limited taxing powers, spending discretion 
limited by minimum service standards or revenue earmarking, overlapping and unclear revenue 
or spending assignment. Insufficient fiscal autonomy is usually reflected in large gaps between 
RG’s mandated spending and revenue assignments —large vertical fiscal imbalances. The 
capacity of financial markets to discipline RGs is undermined by regulatory incentives and lax 
prudential requirements on RG lending, RGs’ access to non-competitive financing sources (CG 
on-lending, public and development banks, state-owned enterprises), and lack of transparent 
and comprehensive public accounts that blur RGs’ creditworthiness. Administrative controls 
such as those guiding RG borrowing are usually not based on clear and objective criteria (e.g., 
ability to service debt). Last, fiscal rules applied to RGs are often poorly designed and weakly 
enforced.  
Common-pool financing provides incentives for overspending. When most RG 
spending is financed out of a common-pool of resources with little or few strings attached, 
overspending —and by implication non-compliance— will become an attractive option. This will 
be the case because RGs will bear only a fraction of the marginal costs of providing regional 
goods and services (Von Hagen, 2005). Common-pool financing is usually provided in the form 
of general purpose, open-ended, and equalization transfers or through debt mutualization 
schemes. The literature shows that excessive dependency on such transfers to finance 
subnational public goods and services exacerbates overspending.10 
2.5 Involuntary Fiscal Non-Compliance and Fiscal Stress 
Involuntary fiscal non-compliance may become likelier in times of fiscal stress. These are 
periods marked by large negative fiscal shocks usually associated with significant economic 
downturns and large fiscal adjustment efforts. In combination, both factors have been shown to 
undermine RG capacity to meet fiscal targets as follows: 
— Shocks and Forecast Errors. Economic shocks commonly trigger fiscal stress, 
making ex-ante feasible targets ex-post unfeasible. Shocks could be 
                                                                          
9. CG preference for bailing out politically aligned regions could also reflect electoral strategies to target safe electoral 
districts, i.e., regions that had previously largely voted for and elected the CG party or governing coalition (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1986). Such preferences may not necessarily prevail if CGs follows a swing strategy, whereby CG will attempt 
to target regions that have previously voted for CG party or governing coalition by narrow margins (Dixit and 
Londregan, 1996). In some cases, such narrow margins may have not been sufficient for CG politically affiliated regional 
partners to win the election and form a government. 
10. See Ter-Minassian (2015) for a recent review. 
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region-specific (idiosyncratic shock) or they could affect the whole country 
(common-shock). A common-shock can affect regions differently depending of 
each region’s economic structure (e.g., a bust in housing prices would affect 
regions where pre-shock median property values had been higher) or exposure to 
fiscal risks (e.g., size of explicit or implicit contingent liabilities assumed by RGs on 
behalf of public enterprises, or regional banks). Large shocks are usually reflected 
in large forecast errors.11 
— Feasible targets and adjustment plans. In times of fiscal stress, CGs, as 
guardians of fiscal sustainability, are under pressure from markets and supranational 
institutions to design and implement ambitious but credible fiscal adjustment plans. 
Such pressure often leads to ex-ante feasible, but very demanding fiscal targets for 
the general government (Beetsma et al., 2009). This is particularly the case for the 
so-called Stability and Convergence Programs of Europe’s Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP). In such programs, fiscal targets need to show ex-ante compliance with 
SGP fiscal rules. Ambitious but feasible general government targets in decentralized 
fiscal frameworks are, in turn, often reflected in ambitious but feasible subnational 
fiscal targets, as CGs try to shift part of the fiscal adjustment effort to regions by 
“passing down the buck” (Vamalle et al., 2012).12 Involuntary fiscal non-compliance, 
as a result, is expected to become likelier as fiscal adjustment to meet a given fiscal 
target increases. RG adjustment efforts, on turn, may increase if fiscal targets are not 
revised following fiscal non-compliance in a given year, leading to persistent fiscal 
non-compliance patterns. Similar arguments explain why CG incentives to enforce 
RGs fiscal target also increase in times of fiscal stress. Failure to do so will increase 
the likelihood that general government fiscal targets will be breached and that 
markets and supranational institutions will hold CG accountable for General 
Government fiscal non-compliance.  
                                                                          
11. Large forecast errors, as discussed in the introduction, could also be the result of strategic considerations to ensure 
ex-ante compliance with fiscal rules. In the context of the recent global financial crisis, they have also reflected larger than 
anticipated fiscal multipliers (IMF, 2015). 
12. This allows CGs to minimize the political costs of fiscal consolidations by preserving the provision of public goods and 
services under their mandate, while avoiding increasing the burden from their own taxes. CGs may also raise subnational 
fiscal targets to build buffers for possible non-compliance at different subsectors, RGs included.  
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3 The Spanish Fiscal Governance Framework 
Numerical fiscal targets at the regional level go back more than two decades in Spain. They 
have been subject to numerous changes before and after the global financial crisis: 
— Budget Consolidation Scenarios and the 2002 Budget Stability Law. Regions 
were first subject to budget balance limits in the form of fiscal deficits ceilings as part 
of the Budget Consolidation Scenarios (BCS) agreed to with the central government 
after 1992. Fiscal deficit ceilings at the regional level came into law four years later 
under the 2002 Budget Stability Law (BSL). The 2002 BSL set a single zero-deficit 
limit for all regions, i.e., all regions were obliged to post a budget outturn that is 
either in balance or in surplus. It also envisaged an adjustment plan with corrective 
actions in the event of non-compliance. Throughout this period, fiscal deficit ceilings 
for each region were set in percent of national GDP. 
— The 2006 Budget Stability Law. The reform of the first BSL approved in 2006 
entered in force in 2007, and was implemented as a consequence of an EU-wide 
reform of the SGP. The 2006 BSL enabled the CG and RGs to adapt their deficit 
and surplus targets to the economy’s cyclical position. Specifically, it allowed the 
RGs to run a deficit of 0.75 percent of GDP if economic growth was below a certain 
threshold, to which a further 0.25 percent of GDP could be added to finance 
increases in productive investment.13 Fiscal deficit ceilings were also set as a 
percentage of regional rather than national GDP. The 2006 BSL included a non-bail 
out clause. It also introduced monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. If a risk of 
non-compliance was detected by the Ministry of Finance, a warning could be made 
to the responsible government unit. In the event non-compliance materialized, the 
non-compliant government was required to draw up an economic and financial 
rebalancing plan over a maximum term of three years. Last, it stipulated that, if a 
deviation from targets were to prompt a breach of the Stability and Growth Pact, the 
tier of government involved should assume the attendant proportion of the 
responsibilities that should arise from the breach. In addition, RGs that fail to meet 
the deficit target would require CG authorization to initiate any debt operations.  
— The 2012 Budget Stability Law. Regional fiscal targets were subject to further 
refinements to comply with EU-wide fiscal governance taking place in the context 
of the Six-Pack, Fiscal Compact, and Two-Pack. A constitutional reform approved 
in 2011 enshrined the rules-based framework in the Constitution. A new BSL 
approved in 2012 introduced structural budget balance, expenditure, and debt 
rules at the regional level. The 2012 BSL refined rules-based monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms to prevent, correct, and penalize deviations from fiscal 
rules and targets introduced in the 2006 BSL. Monitoring and enforcement were 
also reinforced through improvements in the quality, coverage, and frequency of 
intra-year regional and local budget figures and the creation in 2013 of Spain’s 
independent fiscal council —Autoridad Independiente de Responsabilidad Fiscal 
(AIReF). Fiscal deficit limits continued to be measured in percent of regional GDP.  
                                                                          
13. Under the second BSL, fiscal targets were set in three stages. In the first stage, a report assessing the cyclical phase 
for the following three years was prepared. Taking into account the cycle, in a second stage, fiscal targets for the general 
government and subsectors (central, regional, and local governments as well as to the Social Security System) taken 
together were set and submitted to Parliament. Once approved by Parliament and subject to the aggregate RG target, 
individual fiscal targets for each RG were set by means of bilateral negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and 
representatives of each regional government on the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council.  
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4 Understanding Fiscal Non-Compliance among Spain’s Regions 
4.1 Empirical Methodology 
Alternative drivers of fiscal non-compliance among Spanish regions are assessed by looking at 
non-compliance frequencies and compliance margins. To gather some stylized facts, we start 
by examining non-compliance empirical distributions across a number of different potential 
determinants of voluntary and involuntary fiscal non-compliance. We then perform an 
econometric analysis to identify whether fiscal non-compliance is likely to be voluntary by 
looking at the determinants of compliance margins. Our sample includes 16 out of 17 Spanish 
regions over the period 2002-2015.14  
Non-compliance events are defined as cases of negative deviations between fiscal 
outturns and fiscal targets for a given region and year. That is, ௜݂௧	 െ ௜݂௧	∗ 	൏ 0	, where	݂, ݂∗, i, 
and t are fiscal balance outturns, fiscal balance targets, years, and regions, respectively. 
Non-compliance events are sourced from the annual compliance report submitted by the 
Ministry of Finance (MHAP) to the Economic and Financial Council (CPFF).15 The CPFF 
comprises the Minister of Finance and public finance authorities of each region. While MHAP is 
the ultimate body in charge of overseeing regional finances, the CPFF plays a formal role in the 
approval of regions’ fiscal balance targets. 
Non-compliance frequencies are defined in (1) as the ratio of non-compliance cases to 
the total number of cases within that particularly group X. Groups are partitioned by quartiles 
(q) if measured on the basis of a continuous variable.  
ܲ	ሺ ௜݂௧	 െ ௜݂௧	∗ 	൏ 0|	ܺ௤	 	ሻ	ݓ݄݁ݎ݁	ݍ ൌ 1,…	4            (1) 
Compliance margins, ݂௘	 ൌ ݂∗	 െ ݂,are measured in percent of regional GDP. Officially, 
they were measured as differences between fiscal outturns and targets as a percentage of 
national GDP between 2003 and 2007 and as a percentage of regional GDP from 2008 onwards. 
To allow compliance margins to be compared over the years and across regions according to a 
homogenous metric that at the same time reflects differences in regions’ fiscal capacities, we 
have re-estimated official compliance margins in percentage of regional GDP using the latest 
nominal GDP series.16 We did that in two steps: first, we uncovered nominal deficit values by 
multiplying targets and outturns by the nominal GDP available around the time targets and 
outturns were, respectively, set and assessed and second, we divided the difference between 
nominal deficit outturns and targets by the latest nominal regional GDP series. 
                                                                          
14. Spain has 17 regions (Comunidades Autónomas). Nevertheless, two different center-periphery financial arrangements 
are in place. A majority of regions, fifteen, share the Common Regime of regional finances (Comunidades Autónomas de 
Régimen Común), with partial devolution of expenditure and revenues, while the remaining two (Navarre and Basque 
Country) enjoy a special status referred to as the Foral Regime of regional finances (Régimen Foral) under which they enjoy 
almost full spending and revenue autonomy. Within the latter two regions, though, the Basque Country is further 
decentralized, with revenue-raising responsibilities distributed to lower government levels (Diputaciones Forales) broadly 
resembling the provincial structure within the region. The latter region is therefore excluded from the subsequent 
econometric analysis due to the absence of comparable data. 
15. Available at www.minhap.gob.es/esES/CDI/SeguimientoLeyEstabilidad/Paginas/InformesCompletosLEP.aspx. Two 
annual compliance assessments have been conducted since 2013. Non-compliance events defined based on the second 
and final assessment. 
16. The regional GDP series used is measured in market prices and in accordance with the new European System of 
National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010). 
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A dynamic panel regression analysis is used to look at potential determinants of 
non-compliance margins. Non-compliance margins are regressed on the same variables 
conditioning non-compliance frequencies. Estimates are derived using Arellano-Bond 
first-difference General Method of Moments (FD-GMM) estimator in order to allow for possible 
inertial patterns in non-compliance as well as endogeneity of dependent variables. Equation 2 
below summarizes the specification. 
௜݂௧௘ ൌ 	ߙ	 ௜݂௧ିଵ௘ ൅ 	ߛ	ܫܸܱܰܮ௜௧ ൅ 	ߜ	ܸܱܮ௜௧ ൅	ߟ௜ 	൅ 	ߩ௧ 	൅ ߳௜௧																																				(2) 
where	ܫܸܱܰܮ and ܸܱܮ are vectors with factors associated with involuntary and voluntary 
non-compliance events (hereby referred to as voluntary and involuntary factors), respectively; ߟ 
and ߩ are, respectively, country and time fixed effects,	ߙ governs the degree of persistency of 
RG fiscal compliance/non-compliance, and ߛ and ߜ measure the relative contribution of 
involuntary and voluntary factors on fiscal compliance/non-compliance.17 
Our estimation strategy aims at identifying operative economic, institutional, and 
political factors associated with voluntary and involuntary patterns of fiscal non-compliance. In 
light of our relatively short cross-sectional dimension, our identification strategy is implemented 
in a parsimonious way by individually assessing the impact of a larger set of variables expected 
to encourage voluntary fiscal non-compliance on a baseline that controls for lagged fiscal 
non-compliance and the more limited number of factors associated with involuntary 
compliance patterns. To address the problem of over-fitting and biased estimates in small 
cross-section samples stemming from the proliferation of GMM instruments, we use only lags 
t-2 and t-3 and combine our instruments into smaller sets by using the collapse option in 
Roodman’s xtabond2 package for Stata. The robustness of our results are checked using 
two-stage least square (2SLS) estimators. 
4.2 Testable Hypotheses 
The proposed multi-level governance framework developed in Section 2 can help us understand 
fiscal non-compliance among Spain’s regions. It can do so by helping identify to what extent 
regional fiscal non-compliance is voluntary. Voluntary fiscal non-compliance can be the result of 
bailout or overspending incentives driven by welfare or political motives. The framework can also 
look at the role of political, fiscal, and financial market institutions play in shaping such incentives. 
Fiscal non-compliance could have also been involuntary because of common or asymmetric 
shocks, and because of feasible fiscal targets and adjustment plans were borderline feasible. 
Drawing from this framework and empirical analysis referenced in the previous section, Table 1 
summarizes some testable hypothesis that are relevant in the Spanish context. 
 
                                                                          
17. The literature suggests that fiscal deficit at the central government level can encourage deficits at the regional 
government level (see Molina-Parra and Martínez-López, 2015, for the case of Spain) through so-called copycat or 
yardstick effect. Nevertheless, this analysis did not find robust statistically significant evidence to support the hypothesis 
that fiscal compliance at the CG level influences fiscal compliance patterns at the subnational level. The results are 
excluded from the paper for the sake of simplicity. 
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Table 1. Fiscal Non-Compliance Testable Hypotheses 
 
4.3 Facts and Factors 
Fiscal non-compliance between 2003-15 varied markedly across regions both in terms of how 
frequently regions missed the target and by how much these targets have been missed 
(Figure 3). Fiscal non-compliance frequencies appear to be stratified in at least three groups: 
(i) broadly compliers; (ii) broadly non-compliers; and (iii) largely non-compliers. The broadly 
compliers comprise regions that have stuck to their fiscal targets in at least half of the years 
during the analysis periods. This is large and heterogonous group both demographically, 
economically, and historically. It includes the Canary Islands, Galicia, Madrid, Asturias, Castilla 
and León, Extremadura, Andalucía, Aragón, and the Basque Country. Navarra, Rioja, Castilla la 
Mancha, the Balearic Islands, Cantabria, and Murcia are among the broadly non-compliers —
regions missing their targets up to ⅔ of the years. Finally, Valencia and Catalonia have missed 
their fiscal targets in three out every four years during this period. Just like the first group, 
regions in the last two groups have very distinct attributes. Non-compliance frequencies and 
margins appear to be broadly correlated in the sense that more frequent non-compliers tend to 






Channel Variable Non-compliance frequency Compliance Margin
I) Voluntary 
Spillovers Region size Negative/Positive Positive/Negative
Fiscal Autonomy Tax autonomy Negative Positive
Expenditure discretion Negative Positive
Market discipline Financing cost Negative Positive
Access to soft financing Positive Negative
Fiscal Rules Fiscal rules strenght Negative Positive
Political Representation Size of paliament representation Positive Negative
Congruence of regional and national coalitions Positive Negative
Elections Election year Positive Negative
Political Autonomy Regional representation of pro-autonomy parties Positive Negative
II) Involuntary
Shocks Common/nationwide positive shocks Negative Positive
Region-specific positive shocks Negative Positive
Fiscal target adjustment Annual changes in fiscal deficit targets Positive Negative
III) Others
Inertia Compliance of previous years ─ Positive
Note: See Annex for a detailed description of the variables. 
Expected sign
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Figure 3. Regions’ Non-Compliance with Fiscal Deficit Targets 
 
Regions’ fiscal non-compliance increased markedly in the post-crisis years. The 
number of non-compliant regions and their corresponding non-compliance margins also 
increased significantly following the global financial crisis (Figure 4). Non-compliance peaked in 
the post-EU sovereign debt crisis in 2011 when virtually all regions were unable to meet their 
fiscal deficit targets; most of them by very large margins. This deviation was corrected in the 
following years through more realistic projections of shared revenues advanced to the regions 
and supported by fiscal adjustment plans. 
 

































































































































Median non-compliance margins over 2003-15
Homogenous Assessment
Source: Ministry of Finance and authors’ calculations
Note: Under the official assessment, fiscal non-compliance events are defined as differences between fiscal targets 
and outturns in percent of national GDP between 2003 and 2007 and as a percent of regional GDP from 2008-15. 
Under the homogenous assessment, fiscal non-compliance events are defined as differences between fiscal targets 
and outturns in percent of regional GDP between 2003-15 (see Annex). CAN=Canary Islands, GAL=Galicia, 
MAD=Madrid, AST=Asturias, CL= Castilla and Leon; EXT=Extremadura, AND=Andalusia, ARA= Aragon, BASC 




























Source: Ministry of Finance and authors’ calculations
Note: Under the official assessment, fiscal non-compliance events are defined as differences between fiscal 
targets and outturns in percent of national GDP between 2003 and 2007 and as a percent of regional GDP 
from 2008-15. Under the homogenous assessment, fiscal non-compliance events are defined as differences 
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Involuntary Channels and Baseline Specifications 
Fiscal non-compliance, common shocks, and forecast errors are linked. Common shocks are 
proxied by observed deviations between nominal (national) GDP growth outturns and forecasts set 
in annual budget laws (forecast errors).18 Negative (positive) forecast errors in nominal GDP growth 
should undermine (bolster) compliance with fiscal deficit targets through corresponding revenue 
shocks. Non-compliance margins and frequencies have clearly moved in tandem with forecast 
errors (Figure 5). Years when fiscal non-compliance was widespread (2008-11 and 2014-15) have 
usually been years when forecast errors have been negative.19 Regression results provide support 
for the positive correlations between forecast errors and involuntary fiscal compliance, with positive 
and statistically significant estimates in about half of all estimated models (Tables 2 and 3). 
 
Figure 5. Forecast Errors and Regions’ Non-Compliance with Fiscal Targets 
 
Idiosyncratic shocks seem to play a limited role in determining fiscal 
non-compliance. Measured by differences between regions’ real GDP growth, consumer price 
inflation and house price inflation and corresponding national averages, positive idiosyncratic 
shocks are expected to reduce fiscal non-compliance frequencies (Figure 6). Contrary to 
expected, non-compliance frequencies were either the same (real GDP growth) or larger 
(consumer price inflation and house inflation) among cases where idiosyncratic shocks were 
positive. Equally unexpected, positive idiosyncratic growth shocks seem to reduce rather than 
increase fiscal compliance margins. However, country-specific inflation differentials are not 
shown to be statistically significant (Tables 2 and 3). As discussed below, this finding may be 
explained by the relatively strong transfer dependency observed in most regions and, more 
specifically, by that fact that a significant share of regional finances comes in the form of 
transfers from the center allocated with the objective of equalizing regions’ fiscal capacity to 
meet their spending mandates. Thus, reliance on equalization transfers mitigates the revenue 
                                                                          
18. The key assumption here is that forecast errors are mostly driven by unanticipated changes in fundamentals and not 
by technical errors, weak or untimely data, and strategic motives (e.g., overestimated nominal GDP growth forecasts to 
inflate revenue projections and make ex-post excessive spending levels ex-ante compatible with existing fiscal targets). 
Strategic motives and technical errors should play less of a role here to the extent that national growth forecasts are set by 
the center where forecasting capacity and data quality are expected to be on average better than that of regions. 
19. 2010, 2015 (widespread non-compliance and positive forecast error) were exceptions. 
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impact of region-specific shocks, helping regions safeguard their fiscal capacity and, therefore, 
to meet their fiscal deficit targets. 
 Figure 6. Inertia in Regions’ Non-Compliance with Fiscal Targets, 2003–15 
 
Figure 7. Fiscal Non-Compliance and Regions’ Idiosyncratic Exposure to Shocks 
 
Fiscal non-compliance has displayed some inertial patterns. In line with Leal and 
Lopez-Laborda (2015) and Lago Peñas et al., (2016), fiscal compliance margins appear to be 
positively auto-correlated (Figure 7). As mentioned by Argimón and Hernández de Cos (2012), 
this could reflect budget rigidities due to incremental budget processes or multi-year expenditure 
commitments. Tables 2 and 3 confirms such inertial patterns under several specifications.  
Fiscal non-compliance increases with the required adjustment effort. Adjustment 
efforts is measured by differences between the fiscal deficit target in year t and t-1, both in 
percentage of regional GDP, a simple proxy of the required nominal adjustment.20 Adjustment 
                                                                          
20 Adjustment efforts could also be measured by the difference between fiscal deficit in year t and fiscal outturns in t-1. 
Unlike annual changes in fiscal targets, this measure is highly correlated with lagged fiscal compliance margins and for this 
reason we have opted to exclude it from our baseline specification. Replacing it with our chosen adjustment effort proxy 
deliver qualitatively similar results at the expense of rendering lagged fiscal compliance margins statistically insignificant. 
Source: Ministry of Finance and authors’ calculations
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efforts have been quite heterogenous across regions given that fiscal deficit targets, despite the 
existence of different starting fiscal positions, have been set uniformly across regions in most 
years. As expected, adjustment efforts are found to have a negative and statistically significant 
impact on fiscal compliance margins in most specifications (Tables 2 and 3). Estimated 
coefficients range from 0.5 to 1, implying that for each percentage point increase in RGs fiscal 
deficit targets, we should expect compliance margins to decline between 0.5 to 1 percentage 
points.  
Fiscal non-compliance may decrease if regions benefit from gap-filling transfers 
before the assessment date, as discussed in Section II. To verify that we look at differences 
between actual transfers received by the RG from the CG and those originally budgeted. 
Non-compliance margins for a RG that receives more transfers than budgeted should be 
smaller. This hypothesis has been rejected, with regression estimates not significant and with 
the wrong sign (Tables 2 and 3, model 2). One interpretation is that, while improving regions’ 
fiscal capacity and thus stake off involuntary fiscal non-compliance, additional unbudgeted 
transfers reinforce expectations of further gap-filling transfers by end-year thus boosting 
voluntary fiscal non-compliance and more than outweighing the initial deterrent effect. 
Voluntary Channels 
We find some tentative evidence of a positive impact of regions’ size on fiscal non-compliance. 
Regions’ size is measured according to the weight of a region’s population, GDP, and GDP per 
capita in their corresponding national figures. Fiscal non-compliance tends to be more frequent 
among larger regions (i.e., towards the end of the distribution) in all three measures, particularly 
with respect to GDP per capita (Figure 8). Fiscal compliance margins are shown to increase in 
a statistically significant way with regional GDP and regional per capita only under 2SLS models 
(Tables 2 and 3, models 3 to 5). 
Figure 8. Regions’ Size and Non-Compliance with Fiscal Deficit Targets 
 
Insufficient fiscal autonomy to adjust seems to play a role in determining regions’ 
fiscal non-compliance. To assess the impact of fiscal autonomy, we estimate measures of tax 
and expenditure autonomy as well as vertical fiscal imbalances (VFI). Tax autonomy (in line with 
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GDP Population GDP per capita
(Frequency of non-compliant cases over 2003-15 by quartiles)
Source: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 
National Institute of Statistics, and authors’ calculations.
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revenues over which the RG have some degree of regulatory autonomy.21 The larger this share, 
the greater a region’s tax autonomy or fiscal co-responsibility, as it is often referred to in the 
Spanish empirical literature. However, in contrast with the local public finance literature, 
expenditure autonomy is defined here by the degree of discretion over mandated expenditures. 
With health and education mostly mandated to regions under center-imposed minimum 
standards and social protection shared with the center, a larger share of regions’ spending on 
these basic services limits regions’ ability to adjust and comply with fiscal targets once their 
revenue-raising capacity is taken into account. That is, the region’s autonomy to cut expenditures 
is expected to decrease as a region’s spending share in basic services increases. With that in 
mind, we compute the shares of regions’ spending on essential public services (health, 
education, and social protection) and public investment in their total spending.22 Last, following 
Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013), we estimate VFI indicators for each region to capture the extent to 
which regions are unable to finance their own spending with own revenues, regardless of whether 
they have regulatory power of the corresponding tax bases or not.23 As expected, 
non-compliance frequencies tend to be smaller among regions in the top tax autonomy quartiles 
(Figure 9). Although the relation is not significant with respect to fiscal compliance margins 
(Table 2 and 3, model 6). On the other hand, fiscal non-compliance frequencies are not 
necessarily the largest among regions in the top expenditure autonomy and VFI quartiles (i.e., 
regions with greater social mandates and less own resources to fund them).24 That said, as 
expected, fiscal compliance margins decrease as a larger share of regions’ expenditures is 
allocated to social services and public investment –that is, as regions’ expenditure autonomy 
decreases (Tables 2 and 3, model 6). Finally, regions with large vertical fiscal imbalances tend to 
display lower compliance margins, as shown in Tables 2 and 3 (model 7 and 13).  
Figure 9. Regions’ Fiscal Autonomy and Non-Compliance with Fiscal Deficit Targets 
                                                                          
21. Regions have regulatory autonomy over personal income taxes (schedules, allowances, credits), wealth and estate 
taxes and property transfer taxes (schedules, deductions, credits), gambling (exemption, base, rate, credit), and vehicle 
registration (rates). Significant tax decentralization took place following the 1997, 2002, and 2009 reforms of the regional 
financing system.  
22. Regions account for ⅖ of total general government spending on essential public services and more than 90 percent 
when it comes to health in education (Pérez García et al., 2015), but about 5 percent with respect to social protection.  
23. VFIs are defined as [1−ܱݓ݊ ܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁/ܱݓ݊ ܵ݌݁݊݀݅݊݃]. Own revenue (spending) corresponds to region’s total revenue 
(spending) minus transfers received by RGs from the central government and other public entities (transfer paid by RGs to 
the central government and other public entities). 
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The impact of stronger rules on fiscal compliance is not clear cut. As described in the 
previous section, fiscal rules in Spain have become increasingly stronger over the years. They 
are currently among the strictest fiscal rules in Europe, as measured by the European 
Commission (EC) fiscal rule strength index. Stronger rules, however, have not always led to 
improvements in fiscal compliance, partly due to delays enforcing existing monitoring and 
enforcement procedures (Lledó, 2015). Our regression results seem to reinforce this point. 
Under our baseline GMM specification, stronger fiscal rules do not show any direct impact on 
fiscal compliance margins directly. Instead, they seem to have an indirect impact on 
compliance margins by helping reduce inertial patterns (Table 2, models 8 and 9). These results 
are reversed under the 2SLS specification, which show fiscal rules having a direct rather than 
indirect impact on fiscal compliance margins (Table 3, models 8, 9, and 13).  
Financial markets seem to affect fiscal non-compliance through two different 
channels. On the one hand, fiscal non-compliance frequencies are larger among regions with 
lower (poorer) credit ratings and, to some extent, facing larger market-financing costs, 
which seems to provide some support to the idea that financial markets undermine fiscal 
compliance by raising the financing costs of regions that are not perceived as creditworthy 
(Figure 10).25 On the other, fiscal non-compliance becomes less prevalent among regions 
where reliance on market-issued securities vis-à-vis softer bank loans is greater. This 
finding indicates that greater market exposure helps to deter fiscal non-compliance because 
regions internalize the impact fiscal non-compliance would have on credit ratings and 
market-financing costs. Our regression analysis of fiscal non-compliance corroborates the latter 
channel: increases in the financing costs faced by regions in the previous year leads tends to 
increase rather than reduce compliance margins in the following year (Tables 2 and 3, 
model 10). That said, greater reliance on market securities has no statistically or economically 
significant impact on compliance margins (Tables 2 and 3, model 10).  
 
Figure 10. Financial Markets and Regions’ Non-Compliance with Fiscal Targets 
 
 
                                                                          
25. Although one cannot rule out the possibility of reverse causality with fiscal non-compliance leading to poorer credit 
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(Frequency of non-compliant cases over 2003-15 by quartiles)
Source: Ministry of Finance and authors' calculations
1/ regional government's credit ratings.
2/ ratio of region's public debt in government securities to banking loans, 
percent.
3/ region's interest payments in percent of  end-of-year region public debt 
stock.
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Fiscal compliance is weakened during election years, but the role played by politics in 
other areas is less clear-cut. Fiscal non-compliance seems to increase during election years. 
As expected, fiscal non-compliance is more frequent and display wider margins during election 
years (Figure 11; Tables 2 and 3, models 11, 12, and 13). Unlike previous fiscal discipline 
analyses for Spain, but as expected in our framework, political alignment or party congruence 
between central and regional governments notably increases the likelihood of fiscal 
non-compliance. In particular, regions politically aligned to the center are shown to be near 1.5 
times more likely to deviate from targets than non-aligned regions.26 Our regression results 
provide only tentative support to these hypothesis: regions aligned with the center presented 
smaller, albeit statistically insignificant, compliance margins, under most specifications 
(Figure 11; Tables 2 and 3, models 11, 12, and 13). Pro-autonomy regions, defined by the 
percentage of members of parliament from regional pro-autonomy parties – expected to 
deviate from center-imposed fiscal targets – turned out to be only marginally likely to deviate 
from fiscal targets than regions with weaker pro-autonomy preferences, with pro-autonomy 
regions presenting smaller but statistically insignificant margins under most specifications 
(Figure 11; Tables 2 and 3, models 11, 12, and 13). Last, regions with the largest political 
representation in the national parliament are the most frequent non-compliers, albeit not 
necessarily with compliance margins that are statistically significantly smaller (Figure 11; Tables 2 
and 3, models 11, 12, and 13).  
Figure 11. Politics and Regions’ Non-Compliance with Fiscal Deficit Target 
                                                                          
26. As discussed in Section 4.2, this may be the result of CG following a “safe” electoral strategy. Simon-Cosano et 
al. (2012) shows that strategy to be the preferred by national incumbents running in national elections, as reflected in the 
distribution of transfers to regions where the incumbent performs better. 
Frequency of non-compliant cases over 2003-15, by quartilesFrequency of non-compliant cases over 2003-15 by category
Source: Ministry of Finance and authors’ calculations.
1/ Regional government led by same party or government coalition leading central government
2/ Percent of members of regional parliaments from regional/pro-autonomy parties
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Table 2. First-Difference GMM Estimates of Fiscal Compliance Margins 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Lagged non-compliance margin 0.74* 1.09** 0.76* 0.83* 0.76 0.70*** 0.37 0.91** 2.42*** 0.31* 0.73* 0.49 0.24
Growth forecast errors 0.09* 0.04 0.09 0.10* 0.10* 0.12*** 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.12*** 0.04
Region-National growth differential -2.09* -2.67* -2.16* -2.13 -2.00 -0.73 -0.60 -2.32* -1.82* -0.36 -2.17* -1.19 0.24
Region-National inflation differential -0.36 -2.08 -0.39 -1.10 -1.28 -1.27 -2.41** -1.23 -1.68 -2.83* 0.86 -1.29 -1.19
Fiscal Target Adjustment -0.80** -1.13** -0.81** -0.94** -0.85* -0.35 -0.82*** -1.02** -0.99*** -0.51*** -0.68* -0.52 -0.49
Execution minus budgetary transfers (in regional GDP) -0.48
Region weight in national population 3.86
Region weight in national GDP 7.12
Region weight in national percapita GDP 0.36
Tax autonomy 0.03
Social spending share in regional government spending -0.33**
Investment share in total regional spending -0.24***
Vertical fiscal imbalances -0.15*** -0.13**
Fiscal Rule Index 0.05 0.02 0.01
Fiscal Rule Index X Lagged non-compliance margin -0.06**
Region Ratings
Lagged Annual in Change Region Ratings -0.09
Lagged Annual Change in Implicit interest rates 1.03*** 0.19
Ratio of security to loans 0.00
National election dummy -0.60***
Regional election dummy -0.36* -0.50*
Party congruence dummy -0.18 0.40 -0.41***
Pro-autonomy party share -0.03 0.02
Regions' seats in national parliament -0.31 -0.86
Number of observations 176 160 176 176 176 160 160 160 160 145 176 176 144
Number of regions 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 16 16 16
Number of instruments 16 15 16 16 16 15 15 15 15 15 17 17 14
Hansen 0.60 0.80 0.44 0.87 0.66 0.28 0.37 0.82 0.65 0.14 0.68 0.15 0.05
m1 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.23 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.00
m2 0.39 0.61 0.43 0.49 0.42 0.48 0.61 0.66 0.77 0.16 0.28 0.22 0.67
p g
Note: Dependent variable is the difference between regions’ fiscal deficit outturns and fiscal deficit targets. The larger this difference is, the larger is the fiscal compliance margin. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Instrument set in all models includes the second and third lag of the explanatory variables. Hansen is the p-value of the test of the over-identifying 
restrictions (see Hansen, 1982), which is asymptotically distributed chi square under the null hypothesis that these moment conditions are valid.  A p-value equal or higher than 0.05 indicates that the 
instrument set is valid, which is confirmed under all models. m1 and m2 are the p-values of serial correlation tests of order 1 and 2, respectively, using residuals in first differences. The null hypothesis under 
both m1 and m2 tests is that there is no correlation between variables in the instrument set and the residuals.  Observed p-values higher than 0.05 under the m2 test for all models indicates that there is no 
correlation with the instrument set defined in second lags.
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Table 3. Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) Estimates of Fiscal Compliance Margins 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Lagged non-compliance margin 0.49** 0.57** 0.49** 0.41** 0.39** 0.52** 0.75** 0.49** 0.46 0.14 0.30* 0.42** 0.79*
Growth forecast errors 0.04* 0.01 0.04* 0.05*** 0.05** 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.05* 0.07** 0.04** 0.05** -0.02
Region-National growth differential -0.42** -0.46** -0.42** -0.44*** -0.46*** -0.42** -0.41* -0.39** -0.12 -0.26 -0.27** -0.38** -0.40*
Region-National inflation differential -0.47 -0.50 -0.45 -0.54 -0.55 -0.28 -0.50 -0.46 -0.17 -0.44 0.00 -0.51 -0.55
Fiscal Target Adjustment -0.71*** -0.77*** -0.71*** -0.66*** -0.66*** -0.62*** -1.05*** -0.78*** -0.44*** -0.53*** -0.48*** -0.62*** -1.04***
Execution minus budgetary transfers (in regional GDP) -0.22
Region weight in national population -2.59
Region weight in national GDP 2.73***
Region weight in national percapita GDP 0.21***
Tax autonomy 0.02
Social spending share in regional government spending -0.29***
Investment share in total regional spending -0.06***
Vertical fiscal imbalances -0.16*** -0.15***
Fiscal Rule Index 0.14*** 0.04 0.07*
Fiscal Rule Index X Lagged non-compliance margin -0.02
Lagged Annual in Change Region Ratings -0.15
Lagged Annual Change in Implicit interest rates 0.26*** -0.07
Ratio of security to loans 0.00***
National election dummy -0.64***
Regional election dummy -0.20 -0.27*
Party congruence dummy 0.04 0.13 -0.19
Pro-autonomy party share 0.00 0.00
Regions' seats in national parliament -0.58** -0.78*
Number of observations 144 128 144 144 144 128 128 128 128 131 144 144 128
Number of regions 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Number of instruments 6 7 7 7 7 9 7 7 8 9 10 10 11



























Note: Dependent variable is the difference between regions’ fiscal deficit outturns and fiscal deficit targets. The larger this difference is, the larger is the fiscal non-compliance margin. All variables defined in level 
differences. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Instrument set in all models includes the second and third lag of the explanatory variables. Standard errors 
allow for correlation within regions but not among regions (cluster robustness specification).
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5 Conclusions and Policy discussion 
This paper argues that in multi-level governance systems SNGs tend not to comply voluntarily 
with fiscal targets the larger are their compliance costs as well as the costs the CG is expected 
to incur in by enforcing these targets. It proposes a conceptual framework where these costs 
can be, firstly, political and determined by factors directly undermining CGs’ condition to be 
elected and form stable government coalitions (for example, national or regional electoral 
calendar; RGs’ political representation, affiliation, and political autonomy preferences). Second, 
compliance and enforcement costs are also linked to intergovernmental fiscal frameworks – 
fiscal rules, tax and expenditure assignments, borrowing controls – and, more specifically to 
how these arrangements shape perceptions among voters, creditors, and politicians of SNGs’ 
fiscal autonomy and whether them rather CGs should be held politically accountable for any 
disruption in regions’ fiscal obligations in the event of non-compliance. Lack of fiscal autonomy 
shifts political accountability to CGs –thus raising enforcement costs – while stronger rules and 
access to financial markets tips the political barometer towards RGs – thus raising 
non-compliance costs.  
In our framework involuntary fiscal non-compliance, on turn, occurs when SNGs are 
unable to be fiscally compliant even when they are willing to be. This pattern becomes more 
likely in times of fiscal stress, defined as periods with large negative fiscal shocks. Fiscal stress 
times are also periods of increasing (domestic or supranational) political pressures on CGs’ to 
ensure fiscal consolidation targets at the general government level are met. To minimize the 
political costs such pressures entail, CGs tend to “pass the buck” of the adjustment down to 
RGs. This leads to ambitious but feasible center-imposed SNG fiscal targets turned unfeasible 
once the fiscal shock materializes. 
Applied to Spain’s regions, this conceptual framework shows that fiscal non-compliance 
present involuntary traits. We find fiscal non-compliance to be driven by factors partly outside the 
control of Spanish regions, namely common macroeconomic shocks and large adjustment 
efforts. The latter is arguably attributable to ambitious and rigid fiscal targets set by the center as a 
result of national and supranational pressures for general government consolidation referred to 
above.  
Fiscal non-compliance among Spain’s regions has also been shown to have a 
voluntary dimension, with fiscal rather than political arrangements playing a somewhat more 
prominent role. Fiscal deficit targets were missed more frequently and by wider margins the 
lower a region’ s autonomy to cut spending due to expenditure mandates and the larger the 
gap between the resources they can raise to deliver these mandates and their actual costs (i.e., 
the larger VFIs are). Contrary to expectations, stronger and well-enforced fiscal rules have not 
made fiscal compliance more frequent or compliance margins wider. The analysis has also 
identified some tentative support for the disciplinary role of financial markets, with increases in 
regions’ market financing costs reducing fiscal non-compliance margins. The frequencies and 
margins of fiscal non-compliance have also shown to increase during election years. Other 
political factors expected to induce voluntary fiscal non-compliance such as political autonomy 
preferences, political alignment with the center, and political representation demonstrate 
ambiguous or non-significant regression estimates.  
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The main policy lesson in our analysis is that enhancing fiscal compliance in multi-level 
governance systems requires a more comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements that goes beyond strengthening formal rule-monitoring and enforcement 
procedures. This assessment should include not only rule-based fiscal frameworks but also (i) 
the assignment of revenue-raising and spending mandates and (ii) the burden-sharing of fiscal 
consolidation efforts and related setting of fiscal deficit targets. All that with a focus on making 
CG enforcement politically credible. In particular, 
— Rule-based frameworks. To strengthen fiscal compliance at the national level, 
much emphasis has been placed on the need to bolster rule-base fiscal 
frameworks with formal enforcement procedures such as financial and 
administrative sanctions and automatic mechanisms that prevent correct for past 
deviations from fiscal targets (Schaechter et al., 2012). That has been the case in 
Spain, particularly after the most recent reforms which, as discussed, introduced 
some of these procedures, aimed at tackling regional fiscal non-compliance. 
Looking ahead, there is still some scope to further strengthen existing procedures 
by making their activation more automatic and tightening the legal requirements to 
publicly explain deviations from fiscal targets (Lledó, 2015). Such measures may 
come particularly handy during election years when the political costs for the CG 
in enforcing targets are more salient and non-compliance has been shown to be 
more pervasive than in years with no elections. 
— Intergovernmental fiscal responsibilities. In line with previous work looking at the 
effectiveness of subnational fiscal rules (Kotia and Lledó, 2015), our analysis 
stresses the need to revisit and, possibly reduce, existing vertical fiscal imbalances 
by ensuring SNGs revenue-raising and borrowing mandates are consistent with 
their spending mandates. These measures would help strengthen SNG fiscal 
autonomy and policy accountability, including for fiscal deficit targets. In doing so, 
it would make the enforcement of SNG fiscal deficit targets politically less costly 
and more credible.  
— Fiscal consolidation burden-sharing. The negative impact of increases in fiscal 
targets on compliance margins warrants a review of how the burden of fiscal 
consolidation is shared across and within government levels and, correspondingly, 
how realistically fiscal deficit targets are set. SNG reputational costs for 
non-compliance with fiscal targets that are widely perceived as unfeasible among 
voters, markets, and politicians are minimal, rendering even well-designed and well-
implemented enforcement mechanisms toothless. In the case of Spain, this may call 
for adoption of differentiated fiscal targets across regions to balance adjustment 
needs with existing fiscal capacity. In light of the impact of negative growth shocks 
on fiscal compliance, a review is also warranted of how appropriate is the technical 
capacity and procedures behind the formulation of macroeconomic forecasts 
informing central and subnational budgets and fiscal plans.  
 
Two additional qualifications are worth mentioning as regards the normative proposals 
outlined above, that go beyond the scope of our paper:  
— First, while the adoption of differentiated fiscal targets might be efficient when 
conditioning on a given fiscal starting position (that is, a given level of regional 
deficit and debt), in a more general, dynamic setting, moral hazard arguments 
dictate that SNGs may develop incentives not to conduct sound fiscal policies in 
good times. This might be the case when SNGs anticipate that additional room for 
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fiscal maneuver is to be granted in crisis times to those governments with weaker 
initial fiscal positions. The strict implementation of fiscal rules is crucial for the 
development of ex-ante fiscal margins against adverse shocks, and guarantee that 
the heterogeneity of structural fiscal positions among regions in normal times is 
minimized.  
— Second, the international experience shows that the occurrence of subnational 
fiscal crisis cannot be ruled out even in a setting in which national fiscal rules were 
fully credible and intergovernmental fiscal responsibilities were set at an optimal 
level. In the later regard, the recent Spanish experience indicates that granting to 
regions additional instruments to prevent liquidity crisis is warranted, so that 
pressure on the CG to financially support or bail-out SNGs is reduced. In 
particular, the possibility of designing rainy day funds with regular contributions 
during periods of economic prosperity could be studied, along with the 
development of tools that guarantee the regular access of regions to financial 
markets even in periods of fiscal stress (Delgado-Téllez et al., 2016).  
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6 Annex 











Fiscal Non-Compliance Margin (Official Assessment)
Difference between fiscal deficit targets and outcomes in percent of national GDP 
between 2003-7 and in percent of regional GDP from 2008-15 Ministry of Finance
Fiscal Non-Compliance Margin (Homogenous 
Assessment)
Difference between fiscal deficit targets (homogenous assessement) and 
outcomes in percent of regional GDP Authors' own calculation
Fiscal deficit targets (Homogenous Assessment) 
Equal to (Fiscal deficit targets (official assessment) X Nominal GDP (CG 
budget))/Regional GDP between 2003-07 and to fiscal deficit target (official 
assessement) from 2008-15
Authors'  own calculation,  
Ministry of Finance (Nominal and 
Regional GDP)
Growth Forecast Errors
Real GDP growth outturn - Real GDP forecast 
National Institute of Statistics 
(outturn), Ministry of Finance 
(forecast)
Region-National growth differential Regional GDP growth - National GDP growth National Institute of Statistics 
Region-National inflation differential Percent change in regional CPI growth - Percent change in national CPI National Institute of Statistics 
Fiscal Target Adjustment Difference between fiscal defict target (homogenous assessement) in the current 
and previous year Authors' own calculation
Execution minus budgetary transfers (in regional GDP) Transfers from CG (outturns) - Transfers from CG (budget) Ministry of Finance and National Institute of Statistics
Region weight in national population Ratio of regional to national population National Institute of Statistics 
Region weight in national GDP Ratio of regional to national GDP National Institute of Statistics 
Region weight in national percapita GDP Ratio of regional to national percapita GDP National Institute of Statistics 
Tax Autonomy Ratio of regional own revenues (regulatory power) to total regional revenues Authors' own calculation and Ministry of Finance
Social spending share in regional government spending Ratio of regional spending in basic social services (health education and others) to total regional spending. IVIE and Ministry of Finance
Investment share in total regional spending Ratio of regional investment to total regional spending Ministry of Finance
Vertical fiscal imbalances
[1 - Regional Own Revenues/Regional Own Spending], where own regional 
revenue (spending) corresponds to a region's total revenue (spending) minus 
transfers received by  the CG and other public entitites  (transfer paid to the CG 
and other public entitites)
Authors' own calculation
Fiscal Rule Index Numerical fiscal rule strengthen index European Commission
Fiscal Rule Index X Lagged non-compliance margin Interactions between the lag of non-compliance margin and the Fiscal rule index Authors' own calculation
Region Ratings Average rating numerical index, taking into account three rating agencies: Fitch, S&P and Moody's
Authors' own calculation using 
Fitch, S&P, and Moody's 
databases.
Implicit interest rates Regional interest payments in percent of end-of-year regional public debt stock Ministry of Finance
Ratio of security to loans Ratio of total outstanding government securities issued by the regions to outstanding loans from commercial banks Bank of Spain
National election dummy Dummy that equals 1 for the year of national parliament elections. Webpages of the national and regional parliaments. 
Regional election dummy Dummy that equals 1 the year of regional parliament elections. Webpages of the national and regional parliaments. 
Party congruence dummy Dummy that equals 1 if regional and national government led by same party or party coalition
Webpages of the national and 
regional parliaments. 
Pro-autonomy party share Percent of members of regional parliaments from regional/pro-autonomy parties Webpages of the national and regional parliaments. 
Regions' seats in national parliament Share of members of the national parliament elected in each region Webpages of the national and regional parliaments. 
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